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It has been argued that psychoanalytic and biological theories cannot be integrated because
they rely on different epistemological grounds, namely on hermeneutic versus causal expla-
nations, that are inconsistent with each other. Such inconsistency would seriously question
the general possibility of neuropsychoanalytic research. Here, I review three important
arguments that have been raised in favor of this inconsistency: first, that psychoana-
lytic attempts to overcome repression aim to go beyond causal relationships; second,
that hermeneutic explanations are retrospective and context-dependent and therefore fol-
low a different logic than causal explanations; and third, that only causal hypotheses are
falsifiable, while the introspective reasons for one’s own behavior are not. I present argu-
ments against each of these statements and show that actually, causal and hermeneutic
explanations are, at least in principle, consistent with each other. The challenge for neu-
ropsychoanalytic research remains to find indeed empirical examples of theories which are
causal and hermeneutic at the same time.
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INTRODUCTION
Neuropsychoanalysis – the attempt to integrate psychoanalytic
theory and practice with a consideration of the neural basis
of human behavior, cognition, and affects – may take several
forms. Initially, it referred to the psychoanalytic study and ther-
apy of patients with brain lesions (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000;
Solms and Turnbull, 2002). Subsequent studies widened the scope
by including experimental investigations of psychoanalytic con-
cepts – from studies on the neural basis of psychodynamic therapy
(e.g., Axmacher and Heinemann, 2012; Buchheim et al., 2012) to
the operationalization of specific concepts such as the constancy
principle (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010), dreams (e.g., Dresler
et al., 2011; Ruby, 2011), repression (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; see
Axmacher et al., 2010 for a critique of current operationalizations),
psychodynamic conflicts (Loughead et al., 2010), etc. In addition
to this empirical research, the epistemological basis of combining
psychoanalysis and neuroscience has been widely discussed. Here,
my goal is to contribute to this discussion by focusing on one,
particularly problematic aspect, namely the relationship of the
hermeneutic (or “depth hermeneutic,” as it includes unconscious
processes; Lorenzer, 1986) approach taken in the psychoanalytic
attempt to understand and reconstruct conscious and unconscious
narratives, and the scientific strife for explanations in terms of
causal relationships. The following considerations do not intend
to provide an exhaustive overview of all arguments raised on this
issue. Instead, they aim to provide a limited personal account
on a question which remains central for the neuropsychoanalytic
endeavor.
THE PROBLEM
During psychoanalytic therapy, analyst, and client aim to under-
stand the analyst’s mental and affective life. Many aspects of
this inner life appear initially absurd and paradoxical; the belief
that even (and particularly) apparent nonsensical aspects are
relevant and may in principle be understood is a cornerstone
of psychoanalytic theory (Brenner, 1955). The process of
understanding these phenomena has been conceptualized as
“hermeneutic” – as a circular process by which an initial and
superficial understanding is incrementally improved as analyst
and client co-construct meaning through conscious and uncon-
scious affective transference. Scientific researchers also search to
understand seemingly random phenomena when they attempt
to find regularities in their data. These regularities may then
be used to generate predictions for future experiments and to
build hypotheses about underlying causal laws. Freud through-
out his life maintained the ideal to combine these two levels of
investigation – to find scientific explanations for the conscious
and unconscious psychic contents and somatic symptoms that
he observed in his patients. In this combination of qualitative
hermeneutics with quantitative theories, Freudian psychoanaly-
sis had a unique dual epistemological character (Ricoeur, 1970).
Many philosophers (e.g., Habermas, 2005) and psychoanalysts
(e.g., Spence, 1982; Thomä and Kächele, 2006) criticized the bio-
logical ancestry of Freudian psychoanalysis and its attempt to find
“metapsychological” laws of psychic life that resemble the expla-
nations in the natural sciences; instead, they suggested to ground
psychoanalysis on a purely hermeneutic basis.
However, purely hermeneutic explanations are epistemolog-
ically problematic because they typically act in a retroactive
manner – they attempt to explain consisting affects, psychic con-
tents, and somatic symptoms, but do not make predictions about
future developments. Therefore, purely hermeneutic hypotheses
are inherently difficult to falsify, which has been extensively criti-
cized by philosophers such as Popper (1963). This problem would
not occur if hermeneutic reconstructions were (at least in princi-
ple) consistent with causal explanations – in this case, one could
predict that removal of the cause should alter its effect as well.
Indeed, some philosophical accounts of psychoanalysis suggest
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that repressed conflicts generate neurotic symptoms in the same
way as physical causes induce observable effects in the external
world; in this case, one would predict that removal of repression
during the course of psychoanalytic therapy should also alleviate
the symptoms (e.g., Grünbaum, 1984).
On the other hand, several arguments suggest that hermeneutic
reconstructions are fundamentally inconsistent with causal expla-
nations. In the remainder of this article, I will discuss three such
arguments and try to convince the reader that this apparent incon-
sistency does, in fact, not exist. The first argument is based on the
introspective notion that we experience ourselves as free, whereas
no freedom appears to exist in a causally closed world. Similarly,
it has been stated that causal explanations are inconsistent with
the therapeutic aim of an enhanced degree of autonomy. Second,
psychoanalytic reconstructions attempt to provide conscious or
unconscious reasons – for an action, a somatic symptom, or a
psychic content such as an affect (for the opposite view that expla-
nations of seemingly irrational behavior are based on causes but
not reasons, see Davidson, 1982). However, providing a reason
appears to follow a different linguistic logic than finding a cause:
typically, reasons are only given retrospectively, for example to jus-
tify some action. This occurs in a specific social context. Therefore,
depending on the context, very different reasons may be given to
justify the same action. In contrast, a cause should always lead
to the same outcome. Third, while hypotheses on causal connec-
tions are falsifiable, introspectively perceived reasons for my own
behavior appear not to be – I know best the reasons why I acted in
a certain manner.
ARGUMENT 1: FREEDOM AND CAUSALITY
Freud has been abundantly criticized for his scientific orientation.
One of the most famous proponents of this view, the philoso-
pher Juergen Habermas, focused on the process of repression,
which Habermas understands as the transition of a psychic con-
tent from the domain of (conscious) intentional relations into
the world of (unconscious) causal laws: “In contrast to conscious
motivations, the unconscious ones hereby acquire the driving,
instinctual character of something that uncontrollably compels
consciousness from outside it. [. . .] They are twisted and diverted
intentions that have been turned from conscious motives into
causes and subjected communicative action to the causality of
‘natural’ conditions” (Habermas, 2005, p. 161). The therapeutic
work on repressed memories and affects therefore aims to over-
come causality : “Analytic insight, however, affects the causality of
the unconscious as such. Psychoanalytic therapy is not based, like
somatic medicine, which is ‘causal’ in its narrower sense, on mak-
ing use of known causal connections. Rather, it owes its efficacy to
overcoming causal connections themselves” (p. 172).
Habermas understands the interpretation of the client’s life his-
tory during psychoanalytic therapy as a process of emancipation,
which is fundamentally inconsistent with the causal explanation of
symptoms in neurobiology. This fundamental dichotomy between
causal and hermeneutic explanations is based on normative views
of these two approaches: Habermas relates causal explanations
to a suppressive, dominating stance toward (external and inter-
nal) natural processes, while hermeneutics are conceptualized as
a communicative process governed by the ideal of the “unforced
force of the better argument”. However, it remains unclear how the
therapeutic transition from causal laws to hermeneutic relation-
ships should occur. In fact, it seems inconsistent to posit on the one
hand that psychopathological symptoms are caused by repressed
conflicts, but that the revelation of these conflicts removes not only
the cause, but the entire causal relationship (for this criticism,
see Grünbaum, 1984). Furthermore, the claimed inconsistency
between freedom and embedding in causal relationship is only
apparent: through a thorough analysis of what we mean by the
term “free,” philosophers such as Bieri (2001) demonstrated that
actions are not perceived as free if they are unaffected by any causes
(then they would rather be perceived as random), but if they are
unaffected by external force and instead governed by good reasons.
Similarly,psychotherapy should not aim to avoid any influences on
the patient’s behavior, but rather help the patient to act according
to influences he identifies with. In this respect, autonomy means
to be governed by the right laws.
ARGUMENT 2: THE LINGUISTIC LOGIC OF CAUSAL AND
HERMENEUTIC EXPLANATIONS
While causal explanations state an inevitable and lawful rela-
tionship between cause and effect, hermeneutic explanations rely
on deferred reconstructions. To assess whether this difference
indeed leads to an inconsistency of these two types of expla-
nations, the specific “inevitability” of causal explanations need
to be considered in greater detail. Several concepts of causality
exist. Scientific research depends on the investigation of neces-
sary, lawful relationships. Such a necessary relationship corre-
sponds logically to the modus ponens, i.e., to the formulation
that in all cases of occurrence of a cause, the causally related
effect occurs as well; in other words, that it is impossible that a
cause may be observed without its causally related effect: a cause
is a sufficient condition for an effect. It should be noted that
according to the modus ponens, this relationship is not reversible,
i.e., it is well possible that an effect occurs without the corre-
sponding cause. Causes are not necessary conditions, because an
effect may be well caused by different causes. Furthermore, pre-
dictions from causes to effects are usually only valid if other
accompanying circumstances remain constant (“ceteris paribus”).
These other circumstances can be considered additional causes
for this effect – most effects are due to a multitude of causes
(multicausality).
This description is actually well consistent with the deferred
statement of reasons in hermeneutic explanations. Causes only
need to induce specific effects inevitably – and this is indeed
the case whenever reasons are accepted as valid explanations for
actions. When I ask someone “Why didn’t you come to work yes-
terday?” and he responds “Because I was sick,” then his staying at
home is considered as an inevitable effect of his disease. (Again,
this explanation is only valid given other circumstances, ceteris
paribus – e.g., that everybody who is sick stays at home.) Fur-
thermore, this criterion exactly describes a characteristic feature
of psychoanalytic interpretations. To be successful, these interpre-
tations need to be consistent descriptions of the patient’s inner
narrative, such that current symptoms appear as necessary conse-
quences of their past. On the other hand, it is not claimed that this
reconstruction is the only correct one; in principle, the current
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symptom may as well have been caused by other circumstances.
Therefore, psychoanalytic interpretations give sufficient, but not
necessary explanations of psychopathological symptoms, similar
to causal explanations.
ARGUMENT 3: FALSIFICATION AND SURPRISE
Finally, a criterion for causal explanations is that cause and effect
are only related by a mediating mechanism, so that this relation-
ship does not exist a priori, or semantically. For example, one might
say that growth of a tree (as an effect) is caused by water, sun light,
and a cascade of biochemical processes (as causes), but not by the
increased heights of the tree (which in this case is only the defini-
tion of “growth”). The relationship between cause and effect thus
needs to be discovered as a “surprising” result of empirical obser-
vations. Therefore, hypotheses on causal relationships remain in
principle falsifiable – their truth may be disputed, and additional
evidence may be demanded. As hypotheses on causal explanations
state a necessary, lawful relationship, they can be falsified even by
a single observation of a situation in which a cause is not followed
by an effect.
It has been suggested that these characteristics of hypotheses
on causal relationships (to be surprising and falsifiable) do not
apply for explanations of actions by a reason. According to this
line of argumentation, a typical explanation from a first-person-
perspective (e.g.,“Why have you left the party?”–“Because it’s time
for bed and I want to go home”) cannot be falsified: in these expla-
nations, “[. . .] there is no question of ‘giving one’s evidence’ or of
‘making a mistake’ ” (Toulmin, 1954, p. 135). Now, one of the most
important insights of psychoanalysis is that the transparency of
the causes of one’s own behavior is only fictitious. For example, a
patient suffering from alcohol dependence may indicate as a cause
of his alcohol consume that he only drinks for pleasure; in real-
ity, his alcohol consume may have an entirely different function,
for example to interrupt unbearable thoughts and memories. Such
rationalizations of behavior are typically not voluntary deceptions,
but remain intransparent for the patient himself. This is not only
the case during pathological behavior, but in general – the reasons
for one’s own behavior are not necessarily correct and may actu-
ally be disputed and revised (“No, you did not go home because
you were tired but because you couldn’t stand the people on that
party!” – “Well, yes, you are right.”). The apparent transparency of
conscious experience becomes problematic; oneself or others may
provide more appropriate reasons for one’s behavior than initial
introspection does.
Thus, Toulmin’s claim of a fundamental difference between
intentional and causal explanations – that intentional explanations
of one’s own behavior are undisputable and incorrigible – cannot
be maintained. On the contrary: a thorough analysis of the criteria
for successful interpretations in psychoanalytical therapies reveals
that only those interpretations can be considered successful which
are initially surprising for the patient. This has been described by
the psychoanalyst Hamburger (1998) when he writes: “In the ther-
apeutic setting, the psychoanalyst investigates causal relationships
in a manner comparable to approaches in the natural sciences
[. . .]” (p. 269; translation, NA).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taken together, these arguments show that causal and hermeneu-
tic explanations are – in contrast to common belief – not only well
compatible with each other, but even adhere to similar truth crite-
ria. This, however, does not mean that current psychoanalytic the-
ories are already both hermeneutic and causal; this would require a
well-accepted metapsychological foundation, which allows one to
actually generate falsifiable predictions. Indeed, a practical (rather
than epistemological) difference between interpretations during
psychoanalytic therapy and causal explanations in an experimen-
tal context is that in the latter case, a limited number of several
possible causes is usually known in advance; during psychoanaly-
sis, the situation is much more open and complex, making it more
difficult to find possible explanations (apart from even testing
them).
The epistemological consistency between causal and hermeneu-
tic explanations is closely linked to the neuropsychoanalytic
endeavor: on the one hand, it represents a crucial philosophical
requirement for the overall possibility of this field; on the other
hand, neuropsychoanalytic research may one day result in a new
metapsychology, i.e., a psychoanalytic theory that is well-grounded
in contemporary neuroscientific research. This has been described
by the philosopher Achim Stephan: “By its new orientation on the
cognitive sciences and neurosciences, psychoanalysis may even be
strengthened: it would get rid of scientifically questionable ballast,
but may also gain a truly convincing basis for some of its postulated
processes. It is not at all impossible that adequate cognitive or neu-
rophysiologic correlates of the different defense mechanisms can
be found. [. . .] The neurosciences and cognitive sciences may thus
serve as a new and scientifically better supported basis for clinical
theory than the Freudian metapsychology” (Stephan, 2002, p. 81;
translation NA).
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